DTM AT 25: ESSAYS ON THEMES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

This paper describes the development and evolution of research themes in the Design Theory and Methodology (DTM) conference. Essays containing reflections on the history of DTM, supported by an analysis of session titles and papers winning the ``best paper award'', describe the development of the research themes. A second set of essays describes the evolution of several key research themes. Two broad trends in research themes are evident, with a third one emerging. The topics of the papers in the first decade or so reflect an underlying aim to apply artificial intelligence toward developing systems that could `design'. To do so required understanding how human designers behave, formalizing design processes so that they could be computed, and formalizing representations of design knowledge. The themes in the first DTM conference and the recollections of the DTM founders reflect this underlying aim. The second decade of DTM saw the emergence of product development as an underlying concern and included a growth in a systems view of design. More recently, there appears to be a trend toward design-led innovation, which entails both executing the design process more efficiently and understanding the characteristics of market-leading designs so as to produce engineered products and systems of exceptional levels of quality and customer satisfaction.

Genetic algorithm for satellite customer assignment

The problem of assigning customers to satellite channels is considered. Finding an optimal allocation of customers to satellite channels is a difficult combinatorial optimization problem and is shown to be NP-complete in an earlier study. We propose a genetic algorithm (GA) approach to search for the best/optimal assignment of customers to satellite channels. Various issues related to genetic algorithms such as solution representation, selection methods, genetic operators and repair of invalid solutions are presented. A comparison of this approach with the standard optimization method is presented to show the advantages of this approach in terms of computation time

Incentive mechanism to control customer buy-down behaviour

Airlines have successfully practiced revenue management over the past four decades and enhanced their revenue. Most of the traditional models that are applied assume that customers buying a high-fare class ticket will not purchase a low-fare class ticket even if it is available. This is not a very realistic assumption and has led to revenue leakage due to customers exhibiting buy-down behaviour. This paper aims at devising a suitable incentive mechanism that would incite the customer to reveal his nature. This helps in reducing revenue leakage. We show that the proposed incentive mechanism is profitable to both the buyer and seller and hence ensures the buyers participation in the mechanism. Journal of the Operational Research Society (2011) 62, 1566-1573. doi:10.1057/jors.2010.57 Published online 11 August 2010

Provider-Customer Coalitional Games

Efficacy of commercial wireless networks can be substantially enhanced through large-scale cooperation among involved entities such as providers and customers. The success of such cooperation is contingent upon the design of judicious resource allocation strategies that ensure that the individuals' payoffs are commensurate to the resources they offer to the coalition. The resource allocation strategies depend on which entities are decision-makers and whether and how they share their aggregate payoffs. Initially, we consider the scenario where the providers are the only decision-makers and they do not share their payoffs. We formulate the resource allocation problem as a nontransferable payoff coalitional game and show that there exists a cooperation strategy that leaves no incentive for any subset of providers to split from the grand coalition, i.e., the core of the game is nonempty. To compute this cooperation strategy and the corresponding payoffs, we subsequently relate this game and its core to an exchange market setting and its equilibrium, which can be computed by several efficient algorithms. Next, we investigate cooperation when customers are also decision-makers and decide which provider to subscribe to based on whether there is cooperation. We formulate a coalitional game in this setting and show that it has a nonempty core. Finally, we extend the formulations and results to the cases where the payoffs are vectors and can be shared selectively.